Singtel: An SOTP
Valuation
Why my conservative SOTP lands at S$4.59 — 14% below the street's S$5.34 RNAV target — and what the gap actually represents.
My SOTP for Singtel arrives at S$4.59 per share. CGS International published a S$5.34 RNAV-based target on 21 May. The gap is 14%, and it is not model error. It is the difference between what the business is worth on current-market, current-operating inputs and what it could be worth if a pipeline of asset monetisation events lands on schedule.
Why SOTP is the right tool here
Singtel is not a telco. The listed equity wraps a Singapore consumer and enterprise network, an Australian carrier working through post-breach restructuring, a data centre business growing fast enough to attract a growth multiple, and meaningful stakes in seven associates spanning India, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore itself. Running a single DCF across that structure forces you to treat Bharti Airtel's market-cap-backed value as a discounted cash flow — which it is not. The DCF approach systematically undervalues the associate portfolio.
Sum-of-parts is appropriate because each component has a distinct risk profile, distinct comparables, and a distinct question the market is pricing. The Singapore core business is mature, relatively regulated, and generates predictable EBITDA; it compresses correctly to an EV/EBITDA multiple. Optus is still working through the economics of its 2023 breach remediation — a 4.0× multiple is conservative-generous for a carrier in recovery, below Australian peers but reflecting the ongoing uncertainty. The DC segment attracts a 24.1× EBITDA multiple because its growth trajectory peers it to regional data centre operators, not to the parent's core telco business. Associates, where listed, are valued at current market prices. Telkomsel — the one material unlisted associate — is valued at a peer P/E.
The alternative most brokers reach for is RNAV, or Revalued Net Asset Value. RNAV and SOTP share the same additive architecture but diverge on asset valuation. RNAV marks assets at appraised values, incorporates premiums for announced monetisations, and projects forward values for businesses being restructured or sold. My SOTP uses current-market prices and current operating inputs throughout. That conservatism is deliberate. I want a floor — the value that exists without needing any transaction to close, any appraisal to crystallise, any deal to complete on time.
The numbers
The three operating segments produce a combined core EV of S$22,047m. Singapore ex-DC contributes S$8,940m (EBITDA S$1,788m at 5.0× EV/EBITDA), reflecting a mature infrastructure business with limited growth but reliable cash conversion. Optus contributes S$8,576m (EBITDA S$2,144m at 4.0×); the multiple discounts Australian telco peer comparables to account for residual uncertainty on capex trajectory and subscriber economics post-breach. The Data Centre segment contributes S$4,531m at 80% ownership (EBITDA S$235m at 24.1×, consistent with regional DC trading multiples). Deducting estimated net debt of S$8,000m and minority interests of S$157m leaves core equity of S$13,890m before associates.
Core operating businesses
| Segment | EBITDA (S$m) | × Multiple | × Ownership | SGD value (m) | Per share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Singapore ex-DC | 1,788 | 5.0× | 100% | S$8,940 | S$0.54 |
| Optus | 2,144 | 4.0× | 100% | S$8,576 | S$0.52 |
| Data Centre | 235 | 24.1× | 80% | S$4,531 | S$0.27 |
| Total Core EV | S$22,047 | S$1.33 | |||
The associate portfolio is where Singtel's story becomes a conglomerate story — and where the largest single driver lives. Bharti Airtel alone accounts for S$40,719m in stake value at 27.5% ownership, translating to S$2.46 per Singtel share. That is more than half the entire associate portfolio by value, and it moves proportionally with the Bombay Stock Exchange.
Associates
| Associate | Stake | Method | SGD value (m) | Per share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bharti Airtel | 27.5% | Market price | S$40,719 | S$2.46 |
| AIS direct | 24.8% | Market price | S$10,252 | S$0.62 |
| Telkomsel | 30.1% | Peer P/E (11.3×) | S$4,824 | S$0.29 |
| Gulf Development | 7.7% | Market price | S$2,726 | S$0.16 |
| Globe | 46.6% | Market price | S$2,478 | S$0.15 |
| NetLink NBN | 24.8% | Market price | S$977 | S$0.06 |
| SingPost | 21.8% | Market price | S$164 | S$0.01 |
| Total associates | S$62,140 | S$3.75 | ||
Equity bridge
| Line item | S$m | Per share |
|---|---|---|
| Core EV | S$22,047 | S$1.33 |
| Less: net debt | (S$8,000) | (S$0.48) |
| Less: minority interest | (S$157) | (S$0.01) |
| Core equity | S$13,890 | S$0.84 |
| Plus: associates | S$62,140 | S$3.75 |
| Gross SOTP per share | S$76,030 | S$4.59 |
Adding S$13,890m core equity and S$62,140m in associates yields gross equity of S$76,030m — S$4.59 per share across 16,558m shares outstanding. With no holdco discount applied, this is the SOTP. A holdco discount, if applied, would reflect the market's reluctance to pay full fair value for conglomerate structures where the investor cannot directly access all components. Southeast Asian holding companies have historically traded at 15–25% discounts to SOTP. The widget below lets you apply one.
Where I diverge from CGS
CGS International's S$5.34 RNAV target incorporates asset values I am not including. Their methodology marks the DC business at an appraised value above current trading multiples, bakes in incremental value from the STT-GDC acquisition closing in H2 FY26F, and incorporates a premium for tower monetisation optionality that has been flagged but not executed. These are not irrational inclusions — if you believe management will crystallise those premiums on time and at the forecasted price, the RNAV framework captures them correctly. The methodology is internally consistent.
My number is conservative in a specific way: it excludes all of that. It asks what Singtel is worth with the assets it has, valued at prices the market is actually trading today. The S$0.75 gap between S$4.59 and S$5.34 is almost entirely the premium assigned to prospective monetisations. If those events materialise — the DC deal closes, the tower process advances, the DC appraisal proves accurate — then the CGS number converges toward being correct. If they slip, the SOTP floor holds. Both targets are defensible; they are answering different questions. DBS's S$4.27 SOTP target (May 2025) and CGS's own S$4.10 DCF target (June 2025) suggest the floor has been well-understood for some time.
Caveats
- Net debt of S$8,000m is estimated. Singtel's FY26 balance sheet (year-end March 2026) had not been published as of the valuation date; the figure is based on H2 FY26 interim disclosure and management guidance.
- Telkomsel earnings used are CY2025 audited (IDR 19.7tn). Singtel's implied FY26 figure is IDR 21.2tn; I used the audited number to avoid projecting unaudited earnings into the multiple.
- Stake percentages reflect Singtel's H2 FY26 disclosure: Bharti 27.5%, AIS direct 24.8%, Telkomsel 30.1%. These may not align precisely with earlier filings where partial stake sales were in-progress.
- The STT-GDC data centre acquisition closing in H2 FY26F is excluded. This would increase Singtel's effective DC ownership and is a material upside scenario that this analysis does not capture.
- Not investment advice. This is a methodology exercise. The valuation reflects specific assumptions at the date shown, and both the inputs and the conclusions change as markets move.
Personal analysis by Osman Ahmed. Prepared 25 May 2026. Not investment advice. The valuation reflects assumptions at the date shown; markets and inputs change without notice. Do your own work.